Abstract. Most lattice-based cryptographic schemes are built upon the assumed hardness of the Short Integer Solution (SIS) and Learning With Errors (LWE) problems. Their efficiencies can be drastically improved by switching the hardness assumptions to the more compact Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE problems. However, this change of hardness assumptions comes along with a possible security weakening: SIS and LWE are known to be at least as hard as standard (worst-case) problems on euclidean lattices, whereas Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE are only known to be as hard as their restrictions to special classes of ideal lattices, corresponding to ideals of some polynomial rings. In this work, we define the Module-SIS and Module-LWE problems, which bridge SIS with Ring-SIS, and LWE with Ring-LWE, respectively. We prove that these average-case problems are at least as hard as standard lattice problems restricted to module lattices (which themselves generalize arbitrary and ideal lattices). As these new problems enlarge the toolbox of the lattice-based cryptographer, they could prove useful for designing new schemes. Importantly, the worst-case to average-case reductions for the module problems are (qualitatively) sharp, in the sense that there exist converse reductions. This property is not known to hold in the context of Ring-SIS/Ring-LWE: Ideal lattice problems could reveal easy without impacting the hardness of Ring-SIS/Ring-LWE.
Introduction
A euclidean lattice is the set of all integer linear combinations of some n linearly independent vectors belonging to a Euclidean space. There are many algorithmic problems related to lattices. In this work, we will consider the Shortest Independent Vectors problems (SIVP): The goal is to find n linearly independent vectors s 1 , . . . , s n in a given n-dimensional lattice, that minimize max i s i . A standard relaxation of this optimization problem, parametrized by γ(n) ≥ 1, consists in requesting that max i s i is within a factor γ of the optimal value. This variant is referred to as SIVP γ and γ is called the approximation factor. SIVP γ is known to be NP-hard for any approximation factor γ ≤ O(1) (see [3] ). A standard and well accepted conjecture is to assume that there is no polynomial time algorithm that achieves an approximation factor that is polynomial in n, even using quantum computing [22] .
Lattice-based cryptography is a branch of cryptography exploiting the presumed (worst-case) hardness of lattice problems such as SIVP γ . Its main advantages are its simplicity, efficiency, and apparent security against quantum computers. But perhaps the most appealing aspect is that lattice-based cryptographic protocols often enjoy very strong security proofs based on the hardness of worst-case problems. Typically, an average-case problem (solvers of which correspond to a protocol attacker) is shown to be at least as hard as the arbitrary instances of another problem which is presumed difficult. We refer to [22] for a recent survey on lattice-based cryptography.
Two main problems serve as the foundation of numerous lattice-based cryptographic protocols. The first one, introduced by Ajtai in 1996 [1] , is the Short Integer Solution problem (SIS): For parameters n, m and q positive integers, the problem is to find a short non zero solution z ∈ Z m to the homogeneous linear system Az = 0 mod q for uniformly random A ∈ Z n×m q (the notation Z q denotes the ring of integers modulo q). The second one, introduced by Regev in 2005 [30] , is the Learning With Errors problem (LWE). The search version of LWE is as follows: For parameters n and q positive integers and χ a probability density function on T = R/Z [0, 1), the problem is to find s, given arbitrarily many independent pairs (a, 1 q a, s + e) for a vector a ∈ Z n q chosen uniformly at random, and e ∈ T sampled from χ. It is possible to interpret LWE in terms of linear algebra: If m independent samples (a i , 1 q a i , s + e i ) are considered, the goal is to find s from (A, 1 q As + e), where the rows of A correspond to the a i 's and e = (e 1 , . . . , e m )
T . The decision counterpart of LWE consists in distinguishing between arbitrarily many independent pairs (a, 1 q a, s + e) sampled as in the search version and the same number of uniformly random and independent pairs.
Ajtai [1] proposed the first worst-case to average-case reduction for a lattice problem, by providing a reduction from SIVP γ to SIS. Later, Regev [30, 31] showed the hardness of the LWE problem by describing a (quantum) reduction from SIVP γ to LWE. Cryptographic protocols relying on SIS or LWE therefore enjoy the property of being provably as secure as a worst-case problem which is strongly suspected of being extremely hard. However, on the other hand, the cryptographic applications of SIS and LWE are inherently inefficient due to the size of the associated key (or public data), which typically consists of the matrix A.
To circumvent this inherent inefficiency, Micciancio [15, 17] -inspired from the efficient NTRU encryption scheme [11] that can be interpreted in terms of lattices -initiated an approach that consists in changing the SIS and LWE problems to variants involving structured matrices. In these variants, the random matrix A is replaced by one with a specific block-Toeplitz structure, thus allowing for more compact keys and more efficient algorithms. The problem considered by Micciancio in [17] was later replaced by a more powerful variant [13, 26] , now commonly referred to as Short Integer Solution problem over Rings, or R-SIS (it was initially called Ideal-SIS). A similar adaptation for LWE, called R-LWE, was introduced by Lyubashevsky et al [14] (see also [33] ). Similarly to SIS and LWE, these problems admit reductions from worst-case lattice problems [13, 26, 14] , but, however, the corresponding worst-case problem is now SIVP γ restricted to ideal lattices (which correspond to ideals of the ring of integers of a number field corresponding to the specific matrix structure). The latter problem is called Id-SIVP.
Main results. In this paper, we bridge the reductions from SIVP to SIS and Id-SIVP to R-SIS on the first hand, and from SIVP to LWE and Id-SIVP to R-LWE on the second hand. We consider two problems M-SIS and M-LWE, where the letter M stands for module. A module is an algebraic structure generalizing rings and vector spaces, whereas module lattices (corresponding to finitely generated modules over the ring of integers of a number field) generalize both arbitrary lattices and ideal lattices. Note that M-LWE has recently been introduced (although not studied) in [6] , where it is called Generalized-LWE. We describe two new worst-case to average-case reductions: A reduction from Mod-SIVP (i.e., SIVP restricted to module lattices) to M-SIS, and a (quantum) reduction from Mod-SIVP to M-LWE in both its search and decision versions.
The Mod-SIVP to M-SIS and Mod-SIVP to M-LWE reductions are smooth generalizations of the existing reductions: By setting the module dimension and the field degree appropriately, we recover the former reductions. When doing so, the conditions on the approximation factor γ and the modulus q required for the results to hold match with the conditions of the existing reductions, up to a factor that is logarithmic in the lattice dimension. These parameters quantify the quality of the reductions: The hardness of the SIVP problem is given by the approximation factor γ, whereas the bit-size of the average-case instances is proportional to log q.
To achieve these results, we carefully combine and adapt the existing reductions and their proofs of correctness ( [9] and [13] for M-SIS, and [31] and [14] for M-LWE). At a high level, the module structure can be seen as a "tensor" between the lattice and ideal algebraic structures, leading to reductions and proof that can heuristically be seen as "tensors" of the former reductions and proofs.
A larger toolbox for the lattice cryptographer. The hardness results for M-SIS and M-LWE possibly enlarge the tool box for devising lattice-based cryptosystems. Let us consider small examples. The following is an instance of M-SIS for which we can prove hardness for specific values of the parameters n, q and β. Given a i,j 's sampled uniformly and independently from the uniform distribution over /(x n + 1), and the e i 's are sampled from ψ. Note that the existing results on R-LWE and R-SIS already imply that these problems are as hard as some SIVP instances: For example, one can embed an R-SIS instance into the first row of an M-SIS instance, and generate the other row(s) independently. However, with this approach, the hardness of the corresponding worst-case instances is related to n-dimensional instances of SIVP. With our new approach, we can show that the M-SIS instance above is as hard as solving SIVP for a (2n)-dimensional lattice (or, more generally, a (dn)-dimensional lattice, if the number of rows of the M-SIS matrix is d). If SIVP is exponentially hard to solve (with respect to the lattice dimension), the module approach provides a complexity lower bound for solving this simple M-SIS instance that is the square (resp. dth power) of the lower bound provided by relying on R-SIS.
Hedging against a possible non-hardness of Id-SIVP. The SIVP to SIS and SIVP to LWE reductions are qualitatively sharp in the sense that they allow for converse reductions: Both LWE and SIS can be solved using an SIVP solver. Such a result is not known to hold for Id-SIVP and R-SIS/R-LWE, possibly hinting at a weakness of Id-SIVP. We show (in Section 5) that the Mod-SIVP to M-SIS/M-LWE do not suffer from this drawback. Furthermore, Mod-SIVP can trivially be shown to be no easier than Id-SIVP (as any Id-SIVP instance can be encoded into a Mod-SIVP instance of higher dimension). As a consequence, our results lead to cryptographic primitives whose efficiencies are within a constant factor of those based on R-SIS/R-LWE, but for which the worst-case to average-case reduction is sharp.
Id-SIVP has been much less studied than SIVP, and attacks on SIVP working only in the case of ideal lattices cannot be fully ruled out. Such attacks could, for example, exploit the multiplicative structure of the ideals. Such weaknesses due to the multiplicative structure actually exist in the case for the decisional counterparts of SIVP γ : It becomes easy for ideal lattices (assuming γ is not too small), because good and efficiently computable estimates are known for the successive minima of any given ideal lattice (see, e.g., [27, Se. 6] ). It is an important open problem to assess the hardness of Id-SIVP.
Related works. Most SIVP to SIS reductions (including ours) consider the euclidean norm. Peikert [24] described an SIVP to SIS reduction that handles all p norms. Independently, many variants of LWE have been shown as hard as Regev's original LWE: These variants may consist in sampling the secret vector s from the same distribution as the errors [2] , in sampling the error vectors from other distributions [25, 10] and in relaxing the conditions on the factorisation of the modulus [19, Se. 3] (see also the references therein). In [25] , Peikert partially dequantumized Regev's proof of hardness of LWE [31] , by proposing a reduction from (several variants of) the decisional GapSVP problem to LWE. GapSVP γ consists in estimating the minimum of the input lattice to within a multiplicative factor γ. Peikert's classical reduction is restricted to large LWE moduli q (that are additionally required to be products of many small primes in the case of the decisional variant of LWE), unless one considers a variant of GapSVP that is somewhat unusual. Peikert's dequantumization carries over to the module case, by giving a reduction from GapSVP restricted to module lattices to M-LWE (using Lemma 17 from Section 4). Note that it also carries over to ideal/R-LWE setting but is meaningless in this situation as GapSVP is easy for ideal lattices and the involved approximation factors γ (as a good approximation to the minimum known). Other cryptographically useful variants of SIS and LWE proven as secure as SIVP include k-SIS [4] , ISIS [9] and subspace-LWE [12, 28] .
Some computational aspects of module lattices have been investigated in [5, 8] (see also [7, Ch. 1] ). These results show that the additional algebraic structure may be exploited to obtain compact representations of modules (namely, pseudo-bases) similar to lattice bases in Hermite Normal Form and LLL-reduced lattice bases. None hints that SIVP would be any easier when restricted to module lattices.
Road-map.
We first give reminders on euclidean lattices, elementary algebraic number theory and Gaussian measures. In Section 3 we give a reduction from Mod-SIVP to M-SIS. Then, in Section 4, we describe a (quantum) reduction from Mod-SIVP to both the computational and the decisional variants of M-LWE. Finally, we give converse reductions in Section 5, i.e., reductions from both M-SIS and M-LWE to Mod-SIVP.
Preliminaries
Notation. Vectors will be denoted in bold, and if x is a vector, then its ith coordinate will be denoted by x i and its euclidean norm will be denoted by x . For a tuple of vectors X = (x i ) i , we let X = max i x i . The vector e i denotes the vector with 1 in its ith coordinate and 0 in all its other coordinates. Let B ∈ R n be a basis. We letB be the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation of B.
We use standard Landau notations. Furthermore, we say that a function f (n) is poly(n) if it is bounded by a polynomial in n. The notation ω(f (n)) refers to the set of functions (or an arbitrary function in that set) growing faster than c · f (n) for any constant c > 0. A function ε(n) is said negligible if it decreases faster than the inverse of any polynomial function, i.e., if it is n −ω (1) . Finally, a function is exponentially small in n if it is at most 2
−Ω(n) . The statistical distance between two distributions X and Y on a countable set D is defined as follows:
Finally, we let U (S) denote the uniform distribution over the set S.
Remark on the reductions. The worst-case lattice problem SIVP γ is suspected to be exponentially hard to solve with respect to the lattice dimension, even using quantum computations. This is one of its most attractive features for using it as a hardness assumption for devising cryptographic primitives. For this reason, we consider two types of worst-case to average-case reductions from SIVP (and its ideal and module variants): Reductions that assume we have a polynomial time algorithm for solving the considered averagecase problem with non-negligible probability, and (somewhat more unusually), reductions that assume we have a subexponential-time algorithm for solving the considered average-case problem with non-exponentially small probability.
Some algebraic number theory
We briefly recall a few facts on elementary algebraic number theory. We refer the reader to [23] for a thorough introduction.
Number fields. Every complex root of a polynomial g(X) ∈ Q[X] is an algebraic number. The minimal polynomial of an algebraic number ξ is the unique irreducible monic polynomial f of minimal degree such that ξ is one of its roots. An algebraic integer is an algebraic number whose minimal polynomial is in Z[X]. Let ξ be an algebraic number, the number field K = Q(ξ) is a finite extension of the rational number field Q. It is also an n-dimensional vector space over Q with basis {1, ξ, . . . , ξ n−1 }, where n is the degree of f . We call n the degree of K. An element x ∈ K can be represented by the coefficients of the associated rational polynomial modulo f :
The product between two elements corresponds to the product between the two associated polynomials modulo f . Let R be the set of the algebraic integers belonging to K. This is a ring, called the ring of integers (or maximal order) of K. If ξ is an algebraic integer, then
Complex embeddings. Let K = Q(ξ) be a degree n number field, and let f be the minimal polynomial of ξ. The canonical embeddings are the n homomorphisms σ i : K → C that fix every element of Q. We let {σ i } i∈ [s1] denote the real embeddings (corresponding to the real roots of f ), and {σ i } s1<i≤s1+2s2 denote the complex embeddings (corresponding to the complex roots). We have s 1 + 2s 2 = n and we can reorder the complex embeddings so that σ s1+s2+i = σ s1+i for all i ∈ [s 2 ]. We call canonical embedding the ring
). An element of K is fully determined by its canonical embedding. For any x, y ∈ K, we have that σ C (x · y) is the component wise product of σ C (x) and σ C (y).
The trace Tr : K → Q and the norm N : K → Q are defined as follows:
where ·, · is the canonical Hermitian product on C n .
Space H. As in [14] , we will use the following subspace of C n :
The space H is isomorphic to
(e j + e j+s2 ) and
The h j 's form a basis of H as a real vector space. An element x ∈ K can be represented according to the basis (
Ideals. An (integral) ideal I of R is an additive subgroup of R that is closed under multiplication by every element of R. The smallest ideal of R containing the set S is denoted by (S). The quotient R/I is the set of the equivalence classes g + I of R modulo I. For any non-zero ideal, the norm N (I) of the ideal is the number of elements of the quotient ring R/I. We have N ((x)) = N(x), for all x ∈ K.
Let I and J be ideals of R. We define the product of two ideals by IJ = { i α i β i : α i ∈ I, β i ∈ J} and their sum by I + J = {α + β : α ∈ I, β ∈ J}. The ideals I and J are said coprime if I + J = R. As we have (I + J)(I ∩ J) = IJ, if I and J are coprime, then I ∩ J = IJ. An ideal I R is prime if for any ab ∈ I then a ∈ I or b ∈ I. In R, an ideal I is prime if and only if it is maximal, which implies that the quotient ring R/I is the finite field of order N (I). Finally, every ideal of R can be represented as a unique product of prime ideals.
A
The inverse of a fractional I is defined by I −1 = {α ∈ K : αI ⊆ R} and is itself a fractional ideal. We have
Isomorphisms of quotient rings. Lyubashevsky et al [14, Se. 2.3.7] made explicit an isomorphism between I/qI and R/qR for an arbitrary positive integer q, which we recall now. Let R q and R * q respectively denote R/qR and R * /qR * . Let t ∈ I be such that (t)+qI = I (such a t exists and can be found efficiently given I and the prime ideal factorization of (q), see [14, Le. 2.8] ). The function θ I : K → K defined as θ I (x) = t·x induces an isomorphism from R q to I/qI. Moreover, this isomorphism may be efficiently inverted using θ
· y mod qR where y = y mod qI and y ∈ (t). The function θ I also induces an isomorphism from I * /qI * to R * q that may be efficiently inverted using θ
I (y) = t −1 · y mod qR where y = y mod qI * and y ∈ (t). 
The representation of the elements of M with respect to a pseudo-base is unique. Two pseudo-bases can generate the same module and then, they have the same cardinal. The latter is called rank of the module.
We define the dual of a module by
Tr( x, y ) ∈ Z}, where ·, · is the canonical inner product on K d . We have the following property:
For all i, we have x i ∈ I i and y i ∈ I * i , and thus Tr(x i y i ) ∈ Z. Therefore, we have Tr( x, y ) ∈ Z and y ∈ M * .
We now show that
And we obtain Tr( y, x i b i ) ∈ Z. This implies that y i ∈ I * i .
We generalize the isomorphism θ I defined above to modules.
The functions f and g are ring isomorphisms and g = f −1 . Let θ I1 , . . . , θ I d be as described above. We define the functions Θ and Θ −1 as follows:
Cyclotomic fields. A cyclotomic field is a field K = Q(ξ) where ξ is a primitive root of unity. In this work, we will only consider fields of the form Q(ξ) for ξ a primitive 2 k -th root of unity. 4 In this setup, there is an isomorphism between K and Q[x]/ x n + 1 with n = 2 k−1 . We have that s 1 = 0 and s 2 = n/2 because none of the roots of f (x) = x n + 1 is real. This choice of field K leads to several simplifying properties. First, we have
n + 1 induces an isomorphism between R and Z[x]/ x n + 1 . Second, the representations of the elements of K introduced above (σ P , σ C and σ H ) are equivalent up to a similarity. In particular, the ratios
σ H (x) are constant with respect to x ∈ K \ {0}. Another simplifying property is that R * = 1 n R. If q is prime, the prime ideal factorization of (q) ⊆ R can be computed efficiently. In particular, if
As noted in [14, Le. 2.10], the automorphism group of the {τ k } acts transitively on the set {q i } i≤n .
Lattices
We refer to [18, 29] for introductions to lattices and their computational aspects. A euclidean lattice Λ ⊆ R n is the set of all integer linear combinations
n . We write L(B) for the lattice spanned by the basis B = (b i ) i≤p . We call p the dimension of the lattice. In this work, we will restrict ourselves to full-rank lattices, i.e., with p = n.
The minimum λ 1 (Λ) of a lattice Λ is the norm of any of its shortest non-zero vectors. More generally, the ith successive minimum λ i (Λ) is the smallest radius r such that Λ contains i linearly independent vectors of norm at most r.
We consider the following generalization of SIVP. Let φ denote an arbitrary real-valued function of a lattice (e.g., taking φ = λ n allows one to recover SIVP γ ). Let γ ≥ 1 be a function of the dimension n. The Generalized Independent Vectors Problem GIVP φ γ is as follows: Given a lattice basis
For φ = λ n , this problem is NP-hard for any approximation factor γ ≤ O(1) (see [3] ). The best known algorithms (even quantum) for an exact solution and an approximation to within any polynomial factor γ all have exponential complexities [22] . This motivates the following conjecture: There is no polynomial time (quantum) algorithm that approximates lattice problems to within a polynomial factor. The following stronger conjecture also seems to hold: There is no sub-exponential time (quantum) algorithm that approximates lattice problems to within a polynomial factor.
Ideal and module lattices. Let φ be an embedding from K to R n and I an ideal of R. Then φ(I) is a lattice. We call it ideal lattice with respect to K and φ. We will only consider φ = σ P of φ = σ H . We will use the first representation in context of M-SIS and the second one in context of M-LWE. In the case of φ = σ P , notice that σ P (ξx) = σ P (x) for any x ∈ K. As a consequence, we have λ 1 (Λ) = λ n (Λ) for any n-dimensional ideal lattice Λ. We let Id-GIVP denote the restriction of GIVP to ideal lattices.
We define module lattices similarly. Let φ be an embedding from
is a module lattice. We will consider in particular φ = (σ P , . . . , σ P ) and φ = (σ H , . . . , σ H ). To ease the presentation we call them σ P and σ H respectively. Similarly to ideal lattices, we let Mod-GIVP denote the restriction of GIVP to ideal lattices. Note that if M is a rank d module and if K has degree n, then the corresponding module lattice has dimension nd. When a module is given as input of a problem, we consider that we give a lattice basis of the corresponding module lattice. Note that it is equivalent to give a basis of the module lattice and a pseudo-basis of the module because from the first representation, the second representation is computable in polynomial time [5, 7] . All asymptotic statements involving modules (including hardness results) will be given for nd growing to infinity.
Gaussian measures
For a vector c ∈ R n and a real s > 0, the Gaussian function is defined by ρ s,c (x) = e
This function is extended to any countable set A ⊆ R n in the usual way: ρ s,c (A) = x∈A ρ s,c (x). By normalizing the Gaussian function, we obtain the continuous Gaussian probability distribution:
n , a sample from ν r over K R is given by (ν ri ) i . We define Ψ ≤α for α > 0, as the set of Gaussian distributions ν r with r i < α, for all i. For all c ∈ R n , s > 0 and lattice Λ, the discrete Gaussian probability distribution is defined by:
The following theorem ensures that for s large enough, it is possible to efficiently sample according to a discrete Gaussian distribution.
Theorem 1 ([9, Th. 4.1]). There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that, given a basis B of an
, and a center c ∈ R n , outputs a sample that is negligibly (resp. exponentially) close to D Λ,s,c .
The smoothing parameter of a lattice was introduced by [21] . For an n-dimensional lattice Λ and a positive real ε > 0, the smoothing parameter η ε (Λ) is the smallest s such that ρ 1/s (Λ * \{0}) ≤ ε. This parameter gives a threshold above which many properties for continuous Gaussians also carry over to discrete Gaussians. We recall a few standard properties on discrete Gaussians that we will need in our reductions.
Lemma 2 ([21, Le. 3.3]). Let Λ be an n-dimensional lattice and ε >
The latter result implies a (trivial) reduction from SIVP γ to GIVP
. We will describe worst-case to average-case reductions involving GIVP ηε instead of SIVP. In our reductions, we will consider two choices for ε: For the polynomial time reductions, we will use ε = n −ω (1) , and for the sub-exponential time reductions we will take ε = 2
−Ω(n) . 
Lemma 3 ([24, Le. 3.5]). Let Λ be an n-dimensional lattice and
ε > 0. Then η ε (Λ) ≤ ln(2n(1+1/ε)) π /λ ∞ 1 (Λ * ),
]).
Let Λ be an n-dimensional lattice, s > 2η ε (Λ) for ε ≤ 1/100, and c ∈ R n . Then for any (n − 1)-dimensional hyperplane H, the probability that x / ∈ H where x is chosen from D Λ,s,c is ≥ 1/100.
Linear combinations of Gaussians
The sum of two continuous Gaussians with parameters s and r is a continuous Gaussian with parameter √ s 2 + r 2 . We have the following lemma for the sum of a continuous Gaussian and a discrete one. We will also use the following result: Adapted from [24, Cor. 5.3]) . For any lattice Λ ⊆ R n , c ∈ R n , ε ∈ (0, 1), t ≥ √ 2π, unit vector u ∈ R n and s ≥ η ε (Λ), we have:
We generalize [24, Cor. 5.3] and [32, Le. 2.9] to the case of module lattices.
In particular, for t = ω( √ log nd) (resp. t = Ω( √ nd)) the above probability is negligible (resp. exponentially small) with respect to nd.
Proof. This proof builds upon that of [24, Cor. 5.3] .
The principle is to interpret the m Gaussian samples from the nd-dimensional lattice M as one Gaussian sample from the ndm-dimensional lattice L and then apply Lemma 7, where L = M × · · · × M (i.e., the Cartesian product of m copies of M ). We also define c = (
. Therefore, the vector y has distribution D L,s,c . We have: 
where w j ∈ K dm is the unitary vector parallel to (z 1 e j , . . . , z m e j ) ∈ K dm . By Lemma 7, we have, for
The claim follows by applying the union bound over all k ∈ [n] and all j ∈ [d].
5 For the sake of simplicity, we identify elements x of K with their polynomial representations σP (x).
The product of a continuous Gaussian on R with parameter s and a scalar x ∈ R is a continuous Gaussian with parameter xs. This can be generalized to the ring and module settings. The following result is given in [14] , but without proof. In particular, if
Proof. Let us write σ C (x) = j x j · h j where each x j is a sample of ν sj . By definition of the h j 's, we have σ j (x) = (x j + ix j+n/2 ) and σ j+n/2 (x) = (x j − ix j+n/2 ), for 1 ≤ j ≤ n/2. As a consequence:
We want to compute the y j 's such that σ C (e · x) = j y j · h j . For 1 ≤ j ≤ n/2, we have:
Therefore: 
In particular, if
Proof. By Lemma 9, we have that σ H (x k · e k ) has distribution ν s k with for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n/2:
The equality x, e = d k=1 x k · e k completes the proof.
The Short Integer Solution Problem
In this section, we describe a reduction from Mod-GIVP to M-SIS. To ease the presentation, we identify elements of K with their polynomial representations.
Variants of SIS
We first recall the SIS and R-SIS problems, and introduce M-SIS. and β ≥ √ mq n/m , the SIS instance (q, A, β) admits a solution. There are several reductions from GIVP to SIS (see, e.g., [1, 20, 9] ). The strongest known result is the following.
Theorem 2 (Adapted from [9, Th. 9.2]). For ε(n)
, there is a probabilistic polynomial time reduction from solving GIVP ηε γ in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability) to solving SIS q,m,β in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability), for any m(n), q(n), β(n) and
) and m, log q ≤ poly(n).
The R-SIS problem was introduced by [26] and [13] .
Definition 2. The problem R-SIS q,m,β is as follows: Given
This problem over polynomials can be interpreted in terms of matrices. It is a variant of SIS where A is restricted to being block negacirculant: A = [Rot(a 1 )| . . . |Rot(a m )], with:
By using ideas from [14] (namely, the isomorphism between I/qI and R q described in Subsection 2.1) into the proof of [13] , one obtains the following result.
Theorem 3. For ε(n)
= n −ω(1) (resp. ε(n) = 2 −Ω(n) ),
there is a probabilistic polynomial time reduction from solving GIVP ηε γ in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability) to solving R-SIS q,m,β in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability), for any m(n), q(n), β(n) and γ(n)
The problem M-SIS generalizes both SIS and R-SIS. Like R-SIS, the M-SIS problems can be interpreted in terms of matrices. It consists in taking a SIS matrix A of the form: In the rest of this section, we will prove the following result.
Theorem 4. For any d ≥ 1 and ε(nd) = (nd)
−ω(1) (resp. ε(nd) = 2 −Ω(nd) ),
there is a probabilistic polynomial time reduction from solving Mod-GIVP ηε γ in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability) to solving M-SIS q,m,β in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability), for any m(nd), q(nd), β(dn) and γ(nd) such that
3/2 )) and m, log q ≤ poly(nd).
Taking d = 1 in Theorem 4 allows us to recover Theorem 3. Also, by taking d = n and n = 1 in Theorem 4, we obtain a hardness result for SIS that is as good as that of Theorem 2.
A reduction from Mod-GIVP to M-SIS
In order to prove that the new problem M-SIS is as hard as GIVP restricted to module lattices, we use the following intermediate problem, introduced in [20] . 
Definition 4 ([20, Def. 5.3]). The Incremental Independent Vectors Problem IncGIVP ηε γ , is as follows: Given a tuple (B, S, H) where B is a basis of an n-dimensional lattice, S ⊆ L(B) is a full-rank set of vectors such that S ≥ γ · η ε (L(B)) and H is a hyperplane, find h ∈ L(B) \ H such that h ≤ S /2.

Theorem 5 ([16, Th. 6.3]). For any function ε and γ, there is a probabilistic polynomial time reduction from solving GIVP
o(nd) ). The algorithm for Mod-IncGIVP proceeds as follows on input (B, S, H). We write M = L(B).
Let s be such that
).
• For i ≤ m, let y i be sampled from D L(B),s,0 (using Theorem 1), and a i = Θ −1 (y i ) (see Section 2.1).
This algorithm runs in polynomial time (without considering the run-time of oracle O). Also, thanks to the parameter constraints, the interval to which the standard deviation s must belong is non-empty. Moreover, the standard deviation s is sufficiently large for the assumptions of Theorem 1 to hold. Indeed, by [18, Le. 7 .1] and given M and S, it is possible to compute (in polynomial time) a basis T of M such that T ≤ S ≤ S . We use this basis and we have that s ≥ T · ω( √ log nd) (resp. s ≥ T · Ω( √ nd)).
Lemma 11.
The statistical distance between the distribution of (a 1 , . . . , a m ) and the uniform distribution over (R q ) d is a most 2ε.
Proof. We have s ≥ 2q
γ · S and S ≥ γ · η ε (M ). This implies that s ≥ q · η ε (M ) = η ε (qM ). By Lemma 4 applied to the lattices M and qM , the statistical distance between the distribution of (y i mod qM ) and the uniform distribution on M/qM is at most 2ε. As Θ −1 is an isomorphism from M/qM to (R/qR) d , the statistical distance between the distribution of the a i = Θ −1 (y i ) and the uniform distribution on (R/qR) d is also at most 2ε.
As a consequence, the oracle O succeeds with probability (nd) −O(1) (resp. 2 −o(nd) ). In the following, we assume we are in that situation.
Lemma 12.
For any hyperplane H, the probability that the output vector h does not belong to H is ≥ 1/100.
Proof.
As O succeeded, the vector z is non-zero. By definition of h, for every y 1 we have:
Assume that we fix y 1 = y 1 mod qM , then y 1 = y 1 + y 1 , with y 1 fixed and the vector y 1 statistically independent of all the a i 's, z i 's and y i 's for i > 1. The conditional distribution of
As s ≥ 2q · η ε (M ) = 2η ε (qM ), Lemma 5 gives that this probability is ≥ 1/100.
The following completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 13.
We have h ∈ M and, with probability close to 1, we have that h ≤ S /2.
Proof. Let us first show that h ∈ M . We have :
where s i,j ∈ I j and t j ∈ I j . Therefore:
As s i,j ∈ I j for all j, we have
As in the previous proof, we define y i = y i mod qM . Then, we have y i = y i + y i with y i statistically independent from the z i 's and distributed as D qM,s,−y i . By Lemma 8, for s ≥ η ε (qM ) and t = ω( √ log nd) (resp. t = Ω( √ nd)), we know that:
So, with probability close to 1, we have
we have:
, we obtain h ≤ S 2 .
Learning with errors over modules
In this section, we describe a reduction from Mod-GIVP to M-LWE (Learning With Errors over modules).
To ease the presentation, we now identify elements of K with their σ H embeddings.
Learning With Errors
We let T = R/Z denote the segment [0, 1) with addition modulo 1. Let us recall the following definitions from [31] . For a probability density function χ on T and a vector s ∈ Z n q , we let A s,χ denote the distribution on Z 
Theorem 6 ([31]). Let ε(n)
= n −ω(1) (resp. ε(n) = 2 −Ω(n) ), α ∈ (0, 1) and q ≥ 2 such that αq > 2 √ n.
There exists a quantum reduction from solving GIVP
in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability) to solving CLWE q,να in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability).
Assume that q is prime, q ≤ poly(n), and that χ is a probability density function on T. There exists a reduction from CLWE q,χ to DLWE q,χ .
The first main result of [31] is the reduction from GIVP to the computational version of LWE. It makes use of the following intermediary problem, where φ denotes an arbitrary real-valued function on lattice, called Discrete Gaussian Sampling problem (DGS φ ): Given an n-dimensional lattice Λ and a number r > φ(Λ), output a sample from D Λ,r . Regev's reduction proceeds in two steps:
The first reduction is lattice-preserving and also works for the structured versions of LWE to be considered later. Oppositely, the second one will need to be modified. It comes from the following result: non-exponentially small) probability.
Lemma 14 ([31, Le. 3.3]). Let ε(n)
The principle of the Regev's reduction from DGS to CLWE is to use Lemma 14 several times to progressively decrease the value of r. Take r > √ 2q · η ε (Λ) and r i = r · (αq/ √ n) i . The first iteration starts with r 3n > 2 3n > 2 2n λ n (Λ) (using a LLL-reduction algorithm beforehand). Then it obtains poly(n) (resp. 2 o(n) ) samples of D Λ,r3n by Theorem 1, and finishes with poly(n) (resp. 2 o(n) ) samples of D Λ,r3n−1 (the reduction repeats poly(n) (resp. 2 o(n) ) times the same iteration with the same samples in input to obtain sufficiently many different samples in output). It iterates until having poly(n) (resp. 2
then it iterates a last time to obtain samples of D Λ,r0 with r 0 = r > √ 2n · η ε (Λ)/α. These samples are solutions to DGS √ 2n·ηε(Λ)/α . To prove Lemma 14, Regev uses the intermediary problems called q-BDD δ : Given a lattice Λ and any point y ∈ R n within distance δ < λ 1 (Λ)/2 of the lattice, output the coset of Λ/qΛ of the closest vector to y. The proof of Lemma 14 consists also of a sequence of reductions:
Lemma 15
The first reduction also works for the structured versions of LWE to be considered later. However, we will modify the second reduction, by proving an adaptation of the following result.
Lemma 15 ([31, Le. 3.4]). Let ε(n)
, α ∈ (0, 1) and q ≥ 2. Let Λ be a ndimensional lattice and r ≥ √ 2q · η ε (Λ). Given access to an oracle sampling from the distribution D I,r , there exists a probabilistic reduction from solving q-BDD Λ * ,
Regev's reduction from CLWE to DLWE. The second main result from [31] is a reduction from the computational problem CLWE to its decisional counterpart DLWE. This reduction does not carry over to the structured variants of LWE.
Learning With Errors over rings
The R-LWE problem was introduced by Lyubashevsky et al in [14] . Let ψ be a distribution on T R * = K R /R * and s ∈ R * q . (Recall that for our choice of K, we have
s,ψ denote the distribution on R q ×T R * obtained by choosing a ∈ R q uniformly at random and e ∈ T R * according to ψ, and returning (a, (a· s)/q + e).
We also recall the distribution Υ α used in [14] . The gamma distribution Γ (2, 1) with shape parameter 2 and scale parameter 1 has density x exp(−x) for x ≥ 0 and zero for x < 0. For α > 0, a distribution sampled from Υ α is an elliptical Gaussian distribution ν r whose parameters are r i = r i+n/2 = α 1 + √ nx i , where x 1 , . . . , x n/2 are chosen independently from Γ (2, 1). As for R-SIS, this problem can be interpreted in terms of linear algebra. It is a variant of LWE where the matrix A is restricted to being block-negacirculant: A = [Rot(a 1 )| . . . |Rot(a m )] T . The two main results from [14] are a reduction from Id-GIVP to R-CLWE and a reduction from the search version R-CLWE to the decision version R-DLWE. 
]). Let ε(n)
There exists a quantum reduction from solving Id-GIVP ηε γ in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with nonexponentially small probability) to solving R-CLWE q,Ψ ≤α in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability) with γ = 2
Assume that q is prime, q ≤ poly(n), and that x n + 1 has n linear factors modulo q (i.e., we have q = 1 mod 2n). There exists a randomized reduction from R-CLWE q,Ψ ≤α to R-DLWE q,Υα .
The Lyubashevsky et al reduction from Id-GIVP to R-CLWE relies on the same sequence of reductions as Regev's proof of hardness of CLWE, but with problems restricted to ideal lattices. The only step in Regev's reduction that fails to carry over to the ideal/ring setting is Lemma 15. Lyubashevsky et al circumvent it by proving the following. In this Lemma, the problem q-Id-BDD is the restriction of q-BDD to ideal lattice lattices and instead of using the Euclidean norm for bounding the distance to the lattice, they use the infinity norm. in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability) to solving R-CLWE q,Ψ ≤α in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability).
Lemma 16 ([14, Le. 4.4]). Let
The reduction from R-CLWE to R-DLWE from [14, Th. 5.2] proceeds by several reductions between intermediates problems, which we will also consider in our reduction for the module variant of LWE. Let q = 1 mod 2n be prime, then (q) = n i=1 q i where any q i is a prime ideal with norm N (q i ) = q. Lyubashevsky et al define:
• q i -RLWE q,Ψ , with parameters Ψ a family of distributions over T R * and i ≤ n: Given access to an oracle sampling from A In our adaptation to modules, we will keep the general structure of this reduction. The two first intermediates reductions will be modified, while the reduction from DecRLWE to R-DLWE will be kept as it also works in the case of modules.
Learning With Errors over modules
The M-LWE problem generalizes both LWE and R-LWE, and was recently introduced in [6] . Let ψ be some probability distribution on T R * and s ∈ (R * q ) d be a vector. We define A in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability) to solving M-CLWE q,Ψ ≤α in polynomial time with non-negligible probability (resp. in sub-exponential time with non-exponentially small probability).
The principle of the reduction is to construct from y, the input of q-Mod-BDD, and from some discrete and continuous Gaussian samples, the pairs (a, b) distributed as A (M ) s,ψ , where s will directly depend on the closest vector x to y. To produce such samples (a, b) with the desired distribution, we combine the corresponding proofs for LWE and R-LWE (those of Lemmata 15 and 16) . Then a call to the oracle of M-CLWE returns s and let us recover information on x.
Proof of Lemma 17. Let O be the oracle which, given m ≤ poly(n) samples (a, b) from A (M ) s,ψ for ψ ∈ Ψ ≤α , outputs s in polynomial time (respectively subexponential time) with probability (nd) 
We show that the oracle O is used properly, i.e., that what is given to it as input follows a valid distribution A 
By definition, we have
, we have:
As a consequence, we obtain that
We now show that, conditioned on a, the quantity . We now show that e is following the same distribution as e , e with e ∼ ν s,...,s , s = (s i ) i and 
We are now led to considering the distribution of z +e , e . We write e = e 1 +e 2 with e 1 ∼ ν α/(
(which is positive by assumption on e 2,∞ ). As we have α/( √ 2δ) = r/q and r/q ≥ √ 2η ε (M ), Lemma 6 gives us that the statistical distance between the distribution of z + e 1 and ν α/δ is at most 4ε. As a consequence, the statistical distance between the distribution of z + e 1 + e 2 and ν r ,...,r is at most 4ε, with
By using Lemma 10 again with the fixed vector e, we obtain that the statistical distance between the distribution of z + e , e and ν r is at most 4ε, where
As the input of O is within statistical distance ≤ 4ε from A (M ) s,ψ for a distribution ψ ∈ Ψ ≤α and s = Θ(x mod qM * ), oracle O succeeds with probability at least p − 4ε, where p is its success probability given a valid input distribution. If it does succeed, then the output of our reduction is x mod qM * , which completes the proof of Lemma 17.
A reduction from M-CLWE to M-DLWE. Finally, we describe a reduction from the search version M-CLWE to the decision version M-DLWE. We will use the line of proof of [14] for reducing R-CLWE to R-DLWE. Let q = 1 mod 2n be prime. Then (q) = n i=1 q i where any q i is a prime ideal with norm N (q i ) = q. We define the following:
• q i -MLWE q,Ψ , with parameters Ψ a family of distributions over T R * and i ≤ n: Given access to an oracle sampling from A (M ) s,ψ for some arbitrary s ∈ (R * q ) d and ψ ∈ Ψ , find s mod
s,ψ and return (a, b+r/q) where r ∈ R * q is uniformly random and independent in R * q /q j R * for all j ≤ i, and is 0 modulo the remaining q j R * 's.
• DecMLWE 
The reduction is as follows:
-Use the oracle of q i -MLWE with these samples, and get
We show that τ
As a consequence, we have: problem. The principle of the proof is to find, one by one, each one of the d coordinates of s mod q i R * by using the oracle of DecMLWE i q,Ψ . For each coordinate, there are N (q i ) = q ≤ poly(n) possibilities. Therefore, it is possible to try them all in order to find the correct one. To check that a guess is correct, we use the same approach as in [31, Le. 4.2] and randomize a coordinate of a.
To find s 1 mod q i R * , we proceed as follows. Let (a, b) be distributed as A where y ∈ R q is sampled uniformly modulo q i , and is 0 modulo all the remaining q j 's, and where r ∈ R * q is uniformly random and independent modulo q j R * for all j < i, and 0 modulo all the remaining q j R * 's. We have two cases:
• If x = s 1 mod q i R * , then by the Chinese Reminder Theorem we have y(x − s 1 ) = 0 ∈ R * q . As r is chosen uniformly random and independent modulo q j R * for all j < i, and is 0 modulo all the remaining q j R * 's, we obtain that the pair (a , b ) has distribution A (M,i−) s,ψ .
• If x = s 1 mod q i R * , then y(x − s 1 ) is uniformly distributed modulo q i R * , because R * /q i R * is a field (the ideal q i maximal). Also, the quantity y(x − s 1 ) is 0 modulo the other q j R * 's. As a consequence, we have that (r + y(x − s 1 )) is uniformly random and independent modulo q j R * for all j ≤ i and is 0 modulo all the remaining q j R * 's. We obtain that the pair (a , b ) is distributed as A (M,i) s,ψ . We repeat this process d times (once for each coordinate of s), to obtain s mod q i R * .
This completes the proof of the Theorem 8.
Converse reductions
In this section, we show that M-SIS and M-LWE both reduce to Mod-GIVP. This provides converse results to Theorems 4 and 8.
Reducing M-SIS to Mod-GIVP. In this paragraph, we identify elements of the field K with their polynomial representations. Let a 1 , . . . , a m be sampled uniformly and independently in R Note that the map a(x) → a(x −1 ) is an isomorphism. As a consequence, it suffices to obtain a probabilistic lower bound on λ with probability ≥ 1 − 2
−Ω(nt 2 ) over the randomness of the e i 's. Furthermore, as we have than x j ≤ t with probability ≥ 1 − (2 + t)e −t for all j, we obtain that the bound above is itself smaller than 2t 2 n 3/2 αβ with probability ≥ 1 − nt2
−Ω(t) . As R * = 1 n R, if the latter upper bound is smaller than 1 4n , then z, b will be unexpectedly small.
Overall, we have proved that if β is such that n 5/2 ω(log(nd))·αβ < 1, then we can distinguish between the two challenge distributions with non-negligible advantage. By Theorem 9, we thus obtain a reduction from Mod-GIVP 3 ω log(nd) log(1/ε) and log q ≤ poly(nd).
